We can develop this problem in different ways. The first is that it seems that there may be profound differences of opinion on a fundamental moral principle, but which does not correspond to the fundamental criteria of epismer theory to be fundamental. If that is true, there would be no profound disagreement on these principles, which is counter-intuitive. The second problem is based on the first: if we assume that there are fundamental epistemic principles that are part of the causes of the controversies to discuss the fundamental moral principle, the explanation of what makes the differences profound will be that there is a direct disagreement (although possible) on the fundamental principles of epistereum. But this only sounds like a deep moral disagreement in a profound epistemum difference of opinion. The third is based on these two proposals: the belligerents may or may not believe the fundamental moral principle, without epistemic reason. Perhaps none of them are motivated, for epistemal reasons, to believe the truth: what guides their beliefs are their emotional attitudes; or perhaps there is only one causal explanation for their opposing beliefs. In this case, what otherwise appears to be a profound disagreement should be considered superficial. Kappel K, Jench-Clausen K (2015) Epistemic social liberalism and the problem of deep episteremic differences. Moral moral practical theory 18 (2):371-384 How does the fundamental theory of the epistemological principle with regard to the Desiderata work? Let`s look at the classification first.
Remember that in the case of the creation of the Earth, Henry and Richards were deeply dissociating themselves about the age of the Earth: that it should be less than 6,000 years old in the intended sense. Henry seemed to confirm that he was younger, while Richard seemed to deny it. This does not sound like a basic epistemical principle, but a complex quantification sentence: there is an x, x – Earth, and for each y, if x-y, the Y is more than 6000 years old. To take into account the fact that the case of the young earthly creator is a profound divergence of opinion, the proponent of the fundamental theory of the epismeristic principle will have to say that it is indirectly profound, because they are not directly divided on a fundamental episteremic principle, but indirectly (replacing pivotal obligations with fundamental epistemic principles). The epistemic theory that pivotal obligations fall within the scope of rational assessment and are potentially justified or unjustified, but in a non-paradigm manner. In particular, our justification for the pivotal obligations is that we have a right to default to trust or accept them, in the absence of evidence or anything that indicates that they are true. Wright 2004, 2014; Hazlett 2014; Williams 1991) They [deep disagreements] remain recalcitrant to evaluation, because sources of disagreement – the basic principles [hinge commitments] – can be in the background and work remotely. (Fogelin 2005, 8 my supplements). Peacocke C (1989) Transcendental arguments in content theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford Next: What is the position of the reluctant parties to the relevant basic epistemic principles? In the event of a deep direct disagreement, this seems to be a belief. Thus one could say that it is faith in the indirect case, albeit of the reserve faith: what one is prepared to support in view of their other mental states and habits (it is not credible that they believe in these principles in an active and supportive sense).